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“Nominalists see language merely as signs and
sounds used by human beings. One of the things
we want to do with language is to get food, another
is to get sex, and yet another is to understand the
origin of the universe,”
Rorty, EHO, 127.
“Nominalism is a deadly poison to any living
thought,”
Peirce, NEM 3, 201.
 
I. Introduction
1 Those who are familiar with Peircean philosophy will soon realize, after a brief perusal of
some of the better-known texts of Richard Rorty, that they have entered a universe, as far
as their presuppositions are concerned, totally contrary to those adopted by Peircean
philosophy. This universe is designed under various conceptual points, which we will call
“neo-pragmatist theses,” namely:
A. refutation of the concept of representation for its alleged association to ‘non-human fixed
essences’;
B. denial of the possibility of truth as correspondence, for which he uses the ‘mirror of Nature’
metaphor.1 This thesis is evidently closely linked to the previous one;
C. replacement of the concept of discovery by that of invention; 
D. defense of nominalism in the face of a metaphysical realism;
E. denial of the role of language as a medium between subject and object;
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F. introduction of the term ‘redescription’ in lieu of fixed truths, contemplating the factual
contingency of human life.
G. attribution to language of the essential role of tool with which solidarity is forged within a
democratic society – constituted, as such, of citizens who freely express their ideas – seeking
to mitigate human pain and cruelty;
H. replacement of philosophy by literature, as a more efficient tool for the development of
people for the exercise of their solidarity-creating language.
I. proposition of  the  term ‘irony,’  to  define  an anti-essentialist,  desacralized  philosophical
attitude that abdicates from argumentations based on truth in favor of  a more efficient
vocabulary for the discussion of  ideas.  Rortyan pragmatists are self-defined ‘ironists’  (p.
136-45 CIS).
2 To  all  who  adopt  these  viewpoints,  notwithstanding  their  rather  summarized
presentation,  Rorty  called  pragmatists,  declaring  himself  a  particular  follower  of  the
tradition of the pragmatist thought of Dewey and James.
3 Rorty also lists some other traditional names for support, albeit partial, of his theses, such
as  Kant,  Hegel,  Heidegger,  Derrida,  and  Wittgenstein.  References  to  Peirce  are  very
topical,  evidencing a poor reading of Peircean works,  restricted to a few texts of his
youth.
4 That collection of Rortyan theses would suffice, I guess, for a serious scholar of Peircean
works to suggest his exclusion from the roster of those who agree to take part in the
group that Rorty calls frequently in his writings, ‘we pragmatists…’ In addressing some of
the points of discord between Peirce and Rorty, I will endeavor to justify the reason for
this exclusion. I will examine, in general, as befits the limited space of this article, some of
these theses,  and try to explain what  a  critical  position would be,  based on Peirce’s
philosophy. It must be pointed out, however, that none of the Rortyan theses, as detailed
above, are admissible within the context of Peirce’s system of ideas and, for this reason,
to  continue  using  the  term  ‘pragmatism’  to  designate  two,  wholly  antagonistic,
theoretical  standpoints  will  cause,  at  least,  confusion.  Accepting  Peirce’s  exemplary
suggestion that the designation of concepts should be the object of an Ethics,2 it is well
worth retrieving his  term ‘pragmaticism,’3 which he once adopted,  to distinguish his
conception of pragmatism from those that followed his creation in 1878.4
5 In fact, the term ‘pragmaticism’ emerges well after the creation of the doctrine in Peirce’s
youth. The later development of Peirce’s philosophy, which became increasingly realistic
and strongly metaphysical, incorporated additional meanings to pragmatism, turning it
into  a  consequence  of  the  relationship  between  his  three  categories,  definitively
formulated after 1902, when he expounded his Phenomenology in final form. Peirce’s
pragmatism becomes a generalized relationship between the general and the particular,5 in
which the expression practical consequences, stated in original proposition of the maxim in
1878, assumes an increasingly ontological meaning, necessarily extending the sphere of
human conduct to the conduct of all real objects.6 This extensionality of the concept of
pragmatism  derives,  in  fact,  from  the  categorial  symmetry7 between  the
phenomenological and ontolog- ical spheres, fundamental for the conception of Semiotics
as a science that conceives meanings beyond human language.
6 Peirce’s  mature  philosophy  comprises  a  system  of  interlacing  ideas,  suggesting  a
nonfoundationalistic  hierarchy  between  its  diverse  disciplines,  notwithstanding  such
system being concerned with genetic issues, such as his conception of cosmogenesis.8
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7 Rorty  shares  the  tradition  dating  back  to  Nietzsche,  as  well  as  the  majority  of
philosophers  who  strongly  refute  metaphysics  –  anti-essentialists,  as  they  call
themselves.9 However,  among the many possible  questions,  it  should be  asked of  an
instrumentalist  or  utilitarianist  pragmatist  whether  theological  metaphysics,  for
instance, as a source of beliefs of common sense, should be the object of such radical
rebuttal. Should not these beliefs be somehow considered, for their utility to human life,
comforting men in their inexorable finitude before the hard impact of facts, bringing
some hope of life to the destitute? Would this consideration not suffice to admit a sense of
religiousness as something ‘pragmatic’? Is there not, deep down in the radical rebuttal of
theological  metaphysics,  not so much an epistemic issue as Kant put it,  but rather a
reaction  against  religious  institutions  that  have  historically  imposed,  to  an  extremely
human  tendency,  viz.,  an  attraction  to  transcendence,  social  habits  and  a  morality
associated with the exercise of power? Why are the two features, namely, the utilitarian 
experience and the metaphysical refutation, not set aside here, rather than tossing both
out, the bath water and the baby, as popularly said? Seemingly, this issue brings a specter
of  reproach:  some  things  are  useful;  others  do  not  seem  allowed  to  be.  Could  this
propensity toward transcendence not also be merely poetic? Is conduct not pragmatically
characterized on seeing Nature sacralized by a pantheistic conception of divinity – an
opening for a silent and transcendental dialogue with each natural being? Why should
this  potentially  poetic  baby  be  tossed  together  with  the  dirty  water  of  the  moral
dogmatism that restrains the human erotic impulse? Are not ‘redescriptions,’ understood
as  a  deeper  rereading  of  the  diversity  of  facets  that  human  experience  undergoes,
applicable here?10
8 In my view, questions such as those are well worth asking. Deflating philosophy to the
extreme may involve suppressing from it vital components that keep it alive. Perhaps this
is Rorty’s strategy: once anorexic, it can be replaced by literature.
 
II. On the Concepts of Representation and Truth
(Theses A and B)
9 Rorty  sees  the  concept  of  representation  invariably  associated  to  an  external  world
endowed with ultimate essences, which it should mirror. He does not acknowledge any
utility of that concept for human purposes. I believe, however, that this concept requires –
and  I  here  apply  again  an  expression  dear  to  neopragmatists  –  redescription.  This
redescription would seek precisely to understand ‘representation’ within a criterion of
meaning  acknowledged  by  neopragmatism,  namely,  through  its  utilitarist-
instrumentalist angle.
10 Primarily, it is necessary to ‘redescribe’ the world,11 of which the alleged ‘representation’
would be the mirror. Rorty invariably refers to a near pathetic intent of representationists
toward a  precision derived from a  determinist  world  view,  such as  that  outlined in
Enlightenment. This view, however, has long broken away from contemporary science
and  the  philosophies  more  apprised  with  its  history.  For  a  long  time  ontological
determinism has ceased to be the hope not only of those who make science, but also of
those who make it a metalanguage, namely, the epistemologists. Nevertheless, in various
passages  of  his  works,12 Rorty  insists  in  attributing  such  a  determinist  view  to
representationists,  as if  wishing to adopt a convenient general strategy to discredit his
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adversary, who would be nurturing a world view derived from a belief in an all-foreseeing
mathematical God in his project, remaining for man to discover what final laws, with a
status of divine essences, were thought by Him. It would be fitting to ask why the right of
vocabulary change is not granted to representationists. They would say that no respectable
science would expect a determinist behavior from its objects,13 finding it natural to obtain
a  dispersion  of  results  capable  of  being  dealt  with  statistically  through  probability
functions.
11 Why then would the term representation be justified for a theory? If, on the one hand,
representation means an exact, mirroring,  image of particular objects, human knowledge
would have no utility, according to the valuation criterion adopted by neopragmatism.
Alternatively, on the other hand, if representation is associated with final, fixed essences,
it must also be agreed that no utilitarian function would be found in it. However, let us
reformulate the concept of representation as a theoretical prediction of future conduct of its
objects.14 I believe that this function of representations, namely, to anticipate the future
conduct of its objects, characterizes what Peirce meant with he claimed that the meaning
of a positive theory lies in the future,15 namely, in its capacity of foreseeing the future
course of acts. Here, incidentally, when we refer to ‘objects’ or ‘facts,’ we are faced with
Rorty’s  suggestions  that  we should  avoid  these  expressions,  altering  our  vocabulary.
Notwithstanding his acknowledgement of the utilitarian function of the predictability of
theories, he forbids philosophy to speculate on the reason for the success or failure of
such  predictions,  as  if  such  speculation  were  ultimately  guided  by  the  pretense  of
discovery of concealed essences or realities. Here, I believe, lies the crux of the matter of
representation and truth,  as  viewed by neopragmatism.  To Peirce’s  pragmaticism,  to
represent means the primary function of our rationality in predicting what may occur in
the future course of facts, and to guide our own behavior by the unveiling of the theories
on what has not yet happened. To neopragmatism, representation embodies in its concept a
static world-view, permeated with non-human entities, concealed metaphysical essences
and other ghosts more commonly associated to a theological determinism. Applying the
vocabulary used by neopragmatism, if we deflate the objects of representations from this
anachronistic view of a theological determinism, incidentally suggested by Rorty for the
sake of argumentative strategy, I suppose, then representation would be simply associated
to objects endowed with habits of conduct,16 the knowledge of which is of extreme utility to us
to  plan  how  we  should  act  to  accomplish  our  purposes.  But,  viewed  under  an
indeterminist light, a world endowed with randomness would emerge from that alleged
Rortyan mirror as extremely clouded, incorporating this metaphor to another formulated
by Popper (1972) in his brilliant work ‘Of Clouds and Clocks,’17 and such a world image
could not be associated with any precise theory. I believe, however, that instead of trying
to save this metaphor about the mirror, it would be much better to break it once and for
all, fearless of what tragedy could befall philosophy in the next seven years, considering
that  Rorty  always  seems  to  keep  mystics  and  believers  of  a  reality  essentialized  by
something non-human18 under the focus of his criticisms. The conceptual inutility of the
mirror metaphor is distinguished by the fact that no clear image can be seen in it, given
the indeterminate nature of  the object.  In spite of  this  indetermination,  the positive
theories may be perfectly classified by their adherence capacity between the course of
facts and the predictions of those theories. This concept of adherence, common in factual
sciences, would be justified by a conception of structural correspondence between the
rule of conduct that subsumes facts in its phenomenical manifestation and its theoretical
representation, notwithstanding how fallible19 all our affirmations on the world might be.
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We refer here to the Peircean conception that all our positive theories are fallible, not
only  associated  with  an  indeterministic  conception  of  world,  but  also  linked  to  the
randomness seen in human actions.
12 Clearly, then, theories that show good adherence to the course of facts may be considered
true,  without  being  a  definite  truth  or  associated  with  anachronically  metaphysical
determinisms. I would suppose that a highly cultured scientist would certainly refuse to
acknowledge his theories as mere useful tools, but would rather say that many of them are
true, albeit admitting that better theories – meaning more adherent –20 could emerge, and
that those regarded today as possessing good adherence could lose this quality, as a result
of the discovery of new phenomena.
13 Obviously there is a radical difference between what pragmaticism sees as a true theory
and what Rorty states is  a useful  theory.  Pragmaticism possesses a necessary realistic 
presupposition – not a realism that is so called for admitting the existence of an external
world of objects independently of what we say about them, thus contrary to a subjectivist
idealism. A pragmaticist realism proposes the hypothesis that the world contains habits of
conduct, namely, general rules associated to the regularity seen in particular events. This
hypothesis is useful to explain the reason why some theories are adherent and others not,
thus redeeming the concept of fallible truth.
14 There are historical reasons that induce us to suppose the existence of an evolution of
human  knowledge,  a  growth  in  our  repertoire  of  adherent  theories.  Peirce  adopts,
concomitantly, an evolutionist cosmology in which real thirdness grows in the universe,
in tandem with a constant insertion of the diversity that complexifies it. The pragmaticist
hypothesis that investigation tends toward a final agreement of opinions is solely based
on that  evolutionist  conception,  representing  an asymptotic  growth tendency of  the
Peircean category of thirdness. This brief synthesis of the evolutionary intertwinement
that both epistemology and ontology have in Peirce’s philosophy, seeks only to refute
Rorty’s affirmation that Peirce would have claimed that investigation tends to find a
finished reality of essences that would constitute its purpose.21 Similar to many other
opinions of Rorty about the history of philosophy, this point of Peirce’s philosophy would
require  a  redescription  whose  target  would  be  to eliminate  this  ubiquitous  mystical-
theological nature that Rorty attributes to all those who speak of some reality beyond the
language practiced by mankind.
 
III. On Discovery and Invention (Theses C and D)
15 Scientific theories, according to neopragmatists, are inventions that scientists create in
order to have problem-solving ‘tools’ at their disposal. It stands to reason that, although
theories regarded as true are useful, it does not necessarily follow that ‘utility’ is the
guiding criterion for the establishment of a theory for which there is a catholic consensus
on its truthfulness. Also, if a general structure that regulates the conduct of objects –
their habits, to use an expression employed by pragmaticists – is not discovered, then
there is  no way of  explaining why some theories  are adherent and others not.  True
theories are,  in general,  adapted to empirical  data,  under the presupposition that its
predictive form retains the adherence verified experimentally.
16 Ultimately, the issue refers to the nominalist or realist stance before the world. Peirce’s
scholastic  realism22 presupposes  that  there  are  laws  that  act  on the  objects  that  we
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endeavor to know, albeit being laws with varying degrees of cloudiness,  according to
Popper’s metaphor.
17 Evidently, based on a nominalist approach, Rorty will not consider any differentiation
between invention and discovery, since language has the status of tools that must work.
18 Should we, however, wish to reflect why they work, we will be in touch with “things
greater and more powerful than everyday human existence.”23
19 Indeed,  to confuse discovery with invention elicits,  tacitly,  in my view,  two ominous
aspects  for philosophy,  namely,  non-acknowledgment  of  the  otherness  of  the  world,
which leads to an indistinction between reality and fiction.  For no other reason, Rorty
proposes matter-of-factly the replacement of philosophy by literature, after suppressing
from the former all contact with world otherness.
 
IV. Mediation and Redescription (Theses E, F)
20 Rorty also does not admit that language is mediation between subject and object, due to
the fact that, to him, language has an autonomy that turns his neopragmatism, according
to some commentators, into a type of ‘linguistic idealism.’24 In fact, it seems that Rorty
considers the role of mediation as less noble for language, seeing that it would have a role
of representation of the characteristics of the object, having to submit to it in order to
acquire meaning. In actual fact, this denial of the mediating role of language derives, to
my  mind,  from  the  early  theses  based  on  the  nominalism  that  characterizes
neopragmatism.
21 Description and redescription are Rortyan concepts that replace the concepts of truth
and representation, as they are seen, of course, by neopragmatism. There are, however,
serious  problems  that  neopragmatism  would  encounter  when  one  resorts  to  the
pragmaticist  thesis  that  the  meaning  of  a  positive  theory  is  its  esse  in  futuro  or,  as
mentioned before, its predictive power. How, then, to describe the future? Can description
and  inference,  here,  be  considered  equals? The  word  describe,  consistent  with
nominalism,  could not  be applied to general  objects,  but  solely to particular objects.
Therefore, under this vocabulary, how does the predictive function of theories work?
How, in this case, can ‘redescription’ be understood? Would it be the formulation of ad hoc
hypotheses on what did not work out?
22 Here I see the deepest contradiction in the neopragmatist claims. They defend language
as a tool, but not at all connected with any representation of a real world. On the other
hand, representation of reality, in the sense of being constituted of positive theories, is
the only available way we have to predict its future course – without this, language would
be a worthless tool, and therefore its required role of being only a useful instrument to
deal  with  human  experience  would  inexorably  fail.  In  any  sense  that  language  is
successfully predictive of the course of experience, then it is somehow committed to the
representation of the conduct of its real object. And such representation has nothing to
do with mirrors – indeed a metaphor that could be useful if understood as related to
reflection, whose ancient root, the Latin refletire, would fairly describe the hard work of
the human mind to correct theories based on the external images formed by the human
actions they have induced. In fact,  this would be a rich metaphor, namely, mirror as
referring  to  the  reflexive  dialogue  between  the  inner  side  of  our  thoughts  and  the
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external side of our actions, in a self corrective process. This, by the way, is the true core
of Peirce’s pragmatism25 from which neopragmatism passes quite far away.
 
V. On Community and Solidarity (Thesis G)
V.1
23 I recall when, still an engineering student during the late 60s, a professor of the physics of
relativity suggested to lower-income students to purchase the Russian edition of a book
on the theme of the course, which cost a fifth of the American price. Obviously subsidized
by the Soviet Government, the book dealt with the same physics as the considerably more
expensive book published in the United States. Even at that time, this made me wonder
why two ideologically dissimilar societies that were then competing for who would have
the greatest power to destroy the world,26 promoting a frightening and tense cold war,
could produce the same physics? Could there not be a leftist, revolutionary Physics, with
descriptions  and  redescriptions  invented  by  soviet  physicists,  seeking  to  distinguish
themselves from a bourgeois, capitalist and decadent science?
24 Nevertheless,  the  truth  was  that  physicists  from  the  western  and  eastern  blocs,
constituted  a  community  of  researchers  above  ideological,  cultural  and  historical
idiosyncrasies. Is this fact not proof that this community had a common base reaching
beyond  a  mere  sharing  of  opinions  derived  from  conversation  and  creative  use  of
language?  Were  theories  not  guided  by  a  similar  dialogue  with  world  otherness
constituted by the objects of common experience, which imposed an equal set of theories
accepted as true? In this case, if language conferred form to the world, why were not
distinct forms, customary to societies who affirmed themselves by establishing among
them all kind of distinctions, made possible?
 
V.2
25 The  force  of  the  otherness  of  facts,  I  hold,  is  the  only  base  on  which  to  settle  a
community,  whether scientific  or  comprising citizens of  some society.  To reduce the
possibility of a community to free democratic conversation, as the neopragmatist school
does, is to presuppose, on the one hand, that the agreements that supposedly reach a
common good be spontaneously extendable to the whole of society and that, on the other
hand, be effectively complied with.
26 Various counter arguments may be raised against this neopragmatist position. As far as
the extendibility  of  an accord to the totality  of  mankind is  concerned,  one may ask
whether, in defense of the power of language to constitute communities, there is not an
indispensable, albeit tacit, admission of an ethics of good feelings, sufficiently fragile I
suppose,  on  which  to  lay  the  hope  of  human  solidarity.  On  the  other  hand,  a
presupposition that reciprocal agreements are complied with requires an inability to lie
and a capacity to forgo self-interests, in order that such compliance does not deviate from
its course.
27 Pragmatism,  in  its  Peircean  inception,  had  as  its  golden  rule  a  logical  commitment
between  thought  and  action,  a  commitment  of  coherence  that  would  finally  confer
meaning to discourse, to language. For this reason, it had, along with its logical-semantic
dimension, an ethical dimension: action would materialize in the outer plane open as
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common experience, by which the truth of statements is either affirmed or denied. Under
this conception, language lies solely within the dimension of the inner world of men,
namely,  the  world  of  possibilities  that  can  influence  their  actions.  I  hold  that
pragmaticism,  ultimately,  is  a  relationship  of  commitment between  inner  and  outer
worlds, in which acting is how an indeterminate generality of concept is determined,
within a theater of reactions open to common experience.
28 To base humanity’s shortcomings on democratic conversation is to scorn the instance
where language, which has facticity as reference, may appear as fact, namely, human
action that, in the pragmaticist view, is the way in which language emerges from its inner
world and enters the outer world. While not doing so, basing its accords only on itself, on
its inventions of world, on the sophistic power of persuasion through rhetorical seduction,
I fear then the possibility of a reign of terror, of domination, as history often shows,
following thus an opposite path to that presupposed by neopragmatists.
29 Naïve and uninformed is, at best, the supposition that the model of American democracy
is  ideally  exportable  to  other  societies  of  deeply  distinct  historical  backgrounds,
culturally dissimilar to it. One must, however, acknowledge that democracy is a necessary
condition for a society that theoretically respects individual citizen rights. However, it
does not follow that democracy suffices in a reciprocal society, as required by Rorty.
30 We agree that Rorty’s project of a solidary society, as described by him, is utopian. This
project, however, would not be utopian because of an ideality in communion with other
social utopias that the history of ideas records, but rather because it is indeed based on
the naïve hypothesis  that  the solidarity and good will  of  American society would be
disseminated throughout the planet, by the freedom provided by democracy. Would it
suffice for men to converse and exchange vocabulary when it lost its utility? Could one
also ask why would men be sympathetic,  forming a community of  common interests
solely  because  they  are  free  and  share  a  language?  If  American  society  reveals  an
appearance of reciprocal community, would it not be derived from a specific culture,
from a historical contingency that is not the same in other societies? There are many
democracies in emerging nations in which the political class is really solidary, but only
amongst  its  members,  promoting  and  practicing  a  cronyism  that  cloaks  privileges,
corruption, nepotism and other illicit acts. Solidarity, as such, is a fact in any society,
although confined to interest groups.
31 Solidarity sustained on an idea of common good would require, on the one hand, the
effective individual will of each of its members toward this idea and, on the other hand, a
culture in which the acknowledgment of ethical values placed in its practice represented
a community habit.
32 A society judges its politicians pragmatically, namely, by the degree of logical consistency
between discourse and conduct. A philosopher’s abilities would not be required here: the
common citizen is not satisfied with what a public figure declares. Having voted for him,
for his promises, this citizen will demand such consistency: effective conduct will have




33 I recall a creative passage, attributed to Einstein:
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Theory is when you know all and nothing works. Practice is when all works and
nobody knows why. In this case we have put together theory and practice: nothing
works […] and nobody knows why!
34 Notwithstanding the hilarious nature of his conclusion, which pessimistically associates
the negative aspects of theory and practice, it holds some truth in its premises, already
mentioned by Kant in a more refined way, in the Introduction to his first Critique, when
he says that ‘while reason without experience is empty, experience without reason is
blind,’ criticizing, in one fell swoop, both rationalism and empiricism.
35 Reducing theories to mere tools that represent nothing only serves a blind practicalism, on
the one hand or, on the other hand, a practicalism whose occasional success or failure
cannot be explained.
36 We  cannot  simply  consider  failures  as  instances  that  occasion  ‘redescriptions’  or
‘exchange of vocabularies.’  We must understand what caused them, searching for the
general rule that governs the path of otherness in relation to which our actions were ill-
fated. Language and theories as mere tools do not grant this status of generalization that
we seek: we want to learn beyond a mere empiricism that allows for contingent solutions,
as if we were strolling through a stretch of an exponential function and had taken it as
linear: soon a gamut of new experiences would denounce this redescription as a naïve
illusion. Failure and error force us to a more wide-ranging dialogue, beyond our own
language: toward objects taken in their integrity, namely, in their unveiling as existence
open to experience and in their habit of being that surpasses the contingency of mere
particular existence.
37 There are many profound ideas that the history of philosophy has discussed, and which
Rorty seems to ignore:  they orbit  in this interaction between theory and experience,
involving the general and the particular interplay; in the conditions of apprehension and
perception of generality in contingency; in language as a network that captures aspects of
the real, turning them into objects of reflection, with the necessary consideration of their
otherness.
38 I cannot see why, in Rorty’s words, ‘the mysterious and concealed reality of the world,
much greater than us, humans’ can be more barred to us than that which conceals the
innerness of men. On the contrary,  world facticity conceals nothing in an immediate
manner other than what appears mediately, cognizable through inference. However, if
we consider that, pragmatically, language is only revealed in action as its unveiled aspect,
without that instance in which it is exteriorized as determination, it is meaningless. This
is a requirement of pragmaticism, that sees in the action the outer aspect of thought and,
consequently,  of  language.  The conversation of  men is,  no doubt,  necessary,  but  for
pragmaticists it is insufficient for something as important as human solidarity to support
itself.
39 The realistic conversation of pragmaticists goes beyond human language. Semiotics is the
science that considers that men not only converse among themselves, but also reflexively
with the actions and the world facts with which they interact, and which, incidentally, is
also  endowed with a  language constituted by  an interchange of  signs  and meanings
present  in  Nature.  Nominalism  could  only  lead  to  an  anthropocentrism,  and  this
philosophical  approach has  been responsible  for  us  to consider  Nature as  something
foreign to humankind, something devoid of language.27 More than ever, had Peirce had a
close  relationship with Rorty,  he  would resume his  proposal  to  change the name of
pragmatism to pragmaticism, leaving the former to a doctrine that has nothing to do with
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his  philosophy.  Under  these  circumstances,  he  would  surely  say:  we,  pragmaticists,
absolutely refute what you, neopragmatists have been saying.
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NOTES
1. As it appears, exemplarily, in the well-known Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, NJ,
Princeton University Press, 1979, 10.
2. See “Ethics of Terminology” in CP, 2. 219-226 / EP2 263-266.
3. CP 5.414 / EP2 334-335. In this paragraph, Peirce did write: “So then, the writer, finding his
bantling ‘pragmatism’ so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and relinquish it
to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he
begs to announce the birth of the word ‘pragmaticism,’ which is ugly enough to be safe from
kidnappers To show how recent the general use of the word ‘pragmatism’ is,  the writer may
mention that, to the best of his belief, he never used it in copy for the press before today, except
by particular request, in Baldwin‘s Dictionary. [See 1-4.] Toward the end of 1890, when this part
of  the Century Dictionary appeared,  he did not  deem that  the word had sufficient  status  to
appear in that work. [But see 13n.] But he has used it continually in philosophical conversation
since, perhaps, the mid-seventies.”
4. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Popular Science Monthly 12, 286-302; CP-5, 388-410 / EP1
124-141.
5. In CP-5.170, Peirce claimed: “The validity of induction depends upon the necessary relation
between the general and the singular. It is precisely this which is the support of Pragmatism.”
See interesting approaches of pragmatism in Altshuler (1978), Forster (2003), Hookway (2005)
and Liszka (2009).
6. I considered this ontological consequence of pragmatism in, for example, Ibri (2011).
7. 7 I have used the expression “categorial symmetry” due to the indifferent validity of Peirce’s
three categories for subject and object domains. See, for instance, Ibri (2012).
8. See on this subject Turley (1977).
9. An example of Rorty’s anti-essentialism can be found in his “A World without Substances and
Essences” Rorty (1999).
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10. 1My claim is that poetic experience can be considered from the point of view of Peirce’s
pragmaticism, however fully connected with his ontology. See Ibri (2009) and (2010).
11. Notwithstanding ‘world’ being what is most lacking in the neopragmatism discourse.
12. See his insistence on the concept of ‘exact representation’ in, for instance, ORT, 99 and PMN,
377.
13. In CP 1.9, we read “In those sciences of measurement which are the least subject to error –
metrology, geodesy, and metrical astronomy – no man of self-respect ever now states his result,
without affixing to it its probable error; and if this practice is not followed in other sciences it is
because in those the probable errors are too vast to be estimated.” See also NEM-III/2, 897.
14. In CIS, 5-7, Rorty criticizes the conception of language as mediation between subject and
object.
15. In CP 5.427/ EP 2.340,  Peirce said “The rational meaning of every proposition lies in the
future. How so? The meaning of a proposition is itself a proposition. Indeed, it is no other than
the very proposition of which it is the meaning: it is a translation of it. But of the myriads of
forms into which a proposition may be translated, what is that one which is to be called its very
meaning?  It  is,  according  to  the  pragmaticist,  that  form  in  which  the  proposition  becomes
applicable  to  human  conduct,  not  in  these  or  those  special  circumstances,  nor  when  one
entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most directly applicable to self-
control under every situation, and to every purpose. This is why he locates the meaning in the
future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to self-control.”
16. In many passages, Rorty encourages the adoption of creative vocabularies. See, for example
CIS, 20.
17. Popper (1972), "Of Clouds and Clocks,” in Objective Knowledge, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 206-55.
18. See, exemplarily, TP, 226.
19. Margolis  (2007) and Foster (1997) are good examples of  interesting discussion of Peirce’s
fallibilism.
20. I would suggest that adherence actually is a better term to use instead of truth, as the latter
somehow  induces  minds  not  acquainted  with  the  concepts  of  indeterminism  and  fallible
knowledge, as claimed by Peirce, to think on fixed essences, like Rorty insistently does. Truth,
then, would be only used under the consideration that theories are fallible and, consequently,
they must be changed whenever experience imposes such change in any demanded degree.
21. ORT, 131.
22. At this point, scholars should remember the classical and pioneering work by Boler (1963).
23. EHO, 28.
24. Such as mentioned by Brandom (2000: 160).
25. In CP 8.272, we can read such reflexive aspect of Peirce’s pragmatism: “Pragmatism is correct
doctrine only in so far as it is recognized that material action is the mere husk of ideas…But the
end of thought is action only in so far as the end of action is another thought.”
26. I  recall  that  the  soviets  showed  their  concern  for  their  inferiority  in  being  capable  of
destroying the planet only 20 times (!) over, while the Americans were capable of doing it 22
times (!).
27. “The world does not speak. Only we do” (CIS, 6).
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ABSTRACTS
There are significant differences between the neopragmatism as formulated by Rorty, based on
James’ and Dewey’s pragmatism, and what Peirce, in order to distinguish his own approach from
the last two thinkers, called pragmaticism. I take in this paper the concept of solidarity as a
focus, from which those differences will be implied, albeit many other points could be chosen. I
highlight  that  the  usual  Rorty’s  sentence  beginning with  ‘we pragmatists…’  shall  necessarily
exclude Peirce. Exemplarily, I could mention the concepts of representation, which for Peirce has
nothing to do with mirror,  and of  truth that,  for  him, also has no relation at  all  with fixed
essences. Those differences will not only mark a very clear border between the two concepts of
pragmatism,  but  also  will  question  how  the  idea of  community  can  be  supported  only  by
dialogical agreements, without the anchor of common open human experience. Pragmaticism
and neopragmatism differ not only regarding their specific range of philosophical problems but,
moreover, on what kind of problems they really consider as genuinely philosophical.
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